tended to follow committee assignments and seniority more than party affiliation. Democrats collected 55 percent of the dollars. The nexthighest group-psychiatrists and psychologists-gave $389,000, most of which (85 percent) went to Democrats. Podiatrists, orthopedists, osteopaths, pathologists, and a host of other physician specialists contributed a total of nearly $700,000 to federal candidates in the 1990 elections. Of these dollars, 71 percent came through PACs. Overall, the specialists in this group gave 60 percent of their dollars to Democratic candidates. The American Dental Association (ADA) was the primary conduit for campaign contributions from dentists (whose contributions totaled $1.1 million) in the 1990 elections. The ADA's national PAC (along with five other PACs representing state affiliates) accounted for more than $820,000. Democrats collected slightly more than half of the ADA's dollars. Some 91.5 percent went to incumbents. In all, PAC contributions accounted for 82 percent of the dentists' donations.
Nurses followed the footsteps of their physician colleagues at a slightly smaller scale, $378,000. Strictly speaking, the American Nurses Association (ANA)-whose PAC delivered nearly $290,000 of nurses' contributions in 1990-is a labor organization. But the center classifies it under health care because its primary interest is clearly tied to health legislation. Its spending patterns are typical of labor unions, however, in that 85 percent of the nurses' dollars went to Democratic candidates. Surprisingly, only 57 percent of the ANA's money went to incumbents. A second nursing PAC, sponsored by the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, gave $64,000 in the 1990 elections. Two dollars out of every three given by the PAC went to Democrats, but nearly all of the money (99.6 percent) went to incumbents. Individual contributions by nurses directly to candidates accounted for only 6 percent of the group's overall giving. Some 94 percent of the dollars came from PACs.
The American Chiropractic Association is the dominant source of money among chiropractors, who donated $301,000. The association's national PAC, along with nearly a dozen state affiliates, accounted for 83 percent of all contributions. Their political tilt was strongly Democratic. Pharmacists gave 88 percent of their contributions, which totaled $298,000, through PACs in the 1990 elections. The PAC of the National Association of Pharmacists was the leading provider of campaign funds, delivering almost $164,000. Democrats were the chief beneficiaries overall, drawing 68 percent of the pharmacists' dollars. The center's analysis draws a distinction between professional pharmacists and operators of drugstores; the latter were classified as retail establishments since they sell far more than prescription drugs. Drugstore PACs and individual contributors gave approximately $196,000 to federal candidates in D ATAW ATC H 1 2 3 [1989] [1990] . Of this, 53 percent went to Democrats. (These totals are not reflected in the $298,000 that came from pharmacists+) Physical therapists, dietitians, and a variety of other nonphysician health professionals and practitioners were the source of some $375,000 in campaign contributions to federal candidates in the 1990 elections. Ninety-four percent of their dollars came through PACs, and 73 percent went to Democratic candidates. The leading PAC contributors within this group were the American Physical Therapy Association ($150,000) and the American Occupational Therapy Association (nearly $65,000).
Hospitals and nursing homes. Hospitals, nursing homes, and other residential care facilities are another important source of campaign donations. Hospitals gave a total of $1.3 million in political contributions. The American Hospital Association (AHA) is the chief trade association for the nation's hospital administrators. Its PAC provided over $502,000 in campaign contributions in the 1990 elections; 68 percent of the dollars went to Democrats. The Federation of American Health Systems, whose PAC gave $118,000 in contributions, represents investor-owned hospitals. Many of its members, including Humana and the Hospital Corporation of America, support their own PACs. Two other hospital-related PACs gave $50,000 or more in [1989] [1990] : the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals ($74,000) and National Medical Enterprises ($85,000). Both of these PACs followed the strong Democratic-leaning trend of their industry. Overall, hospital groups gave 70 percent of their dollars to Democrats.
PACs accounted for two-thirds of the $535,000 that came from nursing home operators and administrators. The biggest PAC was that of the American Health Care Association, which gave $263,000 to help represent the interests of its member nursing homes in all fifty states. Six other PACs, representing private nursing home operators, gave an additional $90,000 in contributions. Biggest among them were those of Manor Healthcare Corporation ($38,000) and Beverly Enterprises ($36,000). Including both PAC and individual contributions, the nursing home industry gave 72 percent of its dollars to Democrats.
Health services. This broad category encompasses a variety of health care providers, from medical laboratories to home nursing services to health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and ambulance operators. Overall, contributors in this category gave $376,000 to federal candidates in the 1990 elections. HMOs were the single biggest contributors within this group, although their combined $106,000 in contributions was modest by health industry standards. Democrats collected 72 percent of the dollars from within this sector.
Pharmaceuticals and health products. Second only to health profes- Among medical supply and health product manufacturers, which gave $682,000, the biggest contributor was the New Hampshire-based Henley Group, whose PAC gave nearly $99,000 in the 1990 elections. Within the category, 62 percent of the contributions came from PACs, and 55 percent went to Democrats.
In addition to all of the other health care categories, the center also identified $306,000 in contributions from individuals whose interests were clearly connected with the health industry, although their exact category could not be determined from the information provided. Twothirds of the dollars in this catchall group went to Democrats.
Insurance. Insurance companies clearly are at the center of the debate on national health insurance and are a powerful lobby in their own right. The insurance industry's $10.9 million contribution puts it in the top rank of congressional contributors, ahead of commercial banks, defense contractors, oil and gas producers, and the real estate industry.
The biggest source of money within the industry came from companies or trade associations that handle multiple lines of insurance-including health, life, and property and casualty insurance (Exhibit 3). Three-quarters of this amount came from PACs. Companies dealing primarily in health insurance were comparatively modest in their contri- butions-giving just $887,000-but that figure represents only a fraction of companies that would be affected by universal health insurance. Even many companies whose primary product is life insurance earn a portion of their revenues from health and accident coverage. The only group of companies unlikely to be affected by national health insurance are those dealing exclusively in property and casualty insurance; they accounted for only $150,000. As in the health industry, insurance carriers spread their dollars among members of Congress on both sides of the aisle. Democrats captured a narrow majority-53 percent.
Fending off national health insurance is only one item on the insurance industry's congressional agenda. Tax legislation is another perennial concern. In fact, the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee was the main recipient of insurance industry contributions in the 1990 elections. All told, the industry gave more than $1.7 million to members of that committee-an average of over $47,000 per member. But while many of the dollars flowing from insurance to Capitol Hill have more to do with taxation and other issues than with national health insurance, there can be no doubt that the industry's objections to a "government takeover" of health insurance will be carefully considered by politicians who have accepted those dollars over the years.
Where The Money Went
Overall, Democratic candidates captured 57 percent of the health industry's campaign contributions in the 1990 elections and 53 percent of the money that came from the insurance industry. Hospitals and health service companies were the most likely to give to Democrats (each gave 70 percent or more). Pharmaceutical and health product manufacturers were the only group to favor Republicans.
In one respect, the health and insurance industries' preference for Democrats matches that of many other business groups-even those who may be closer philosophically to the Republican party. Without the support of Democrats, who as the majority party control the committee and subcommittee chairmanships, no legislation on Capitol Hill is likely to become law. Recognizing that political reality, many business groups-regardless of their political preferences-deliver their campaign dollars to both sides of the aisle. Overall, Democrats won a slight majority of the campaign dollars delivered by business interests in the 1990 election. They also collected 92 percent of labor dollars and about two-thirds of the money given by ideological and single-issue groups.
Top Senate recipients in 1990. Tracking campaign contributions among senators is more complicated than for House members, for a variety of reasons. First, since senators run only once every six years, who receives industry money in a particular year is more reflective of who is running and who is not than of whom a particular industry favors. Second, unlike House members, who typically have only two committee assignments, senators generally split their time between three or four committees, thus diluting the time they spend on any single issue. For these reasons, parallels between committee assignments and campaign donations are far more obvious in the House than in the Senate.
Exhibit 4 lists Senate recipients of contributions from the health and insurance industries, ranked by amount of funds from the particular industry. All but Hank Brown (R-CO) and Lynn Martin (R-IL)-both House incumbents running for the Senate-were Senate incumbents. All but Martin won their races. Phil Gramm (R-TX) led all other recipients of health care contributions. Of his total, some $387,000 came from physicians and other health professionals. This may have been more a reflection of the size of his overall reelection effort than of specific committee assignments. His campaign collected over $16.2 million in contributions-second only to Jesse Helms (R-NC).
The connection between contributions and committee assignments is much clearer for the second-leading recipient of health dollars-John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV (D-WV), who chairs the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Medicare and Long-Term Care. Besides the $251,000 he received from health professionals, he also drew $102,000 from hospitals and nursing homes. Pharmaceutical and health product manufacturers gave $53,000. Two other top health industry recipients-Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and Max Baucus (D-MT)-sit on the Medicare subcommittee, and Tom Harkin (D-IA) is a member of the Appropriations subcommittee that deals with health. None of the other top health industry recipients had health-related committee assignments. Six of the top ten insurance industry recipients in the Senate were also on the top ten health industry list. Third-ranking Brown was an incumbent House member seeking an open Senate seat in 1990. The heavy support he received from insurance contributors was likely influenced by the fact that he held a seat on the Ways and Means Committee-a panel of particular importance to the insurance industry, because it has jurisdiction over the nation's tax laws.
Top House recipients in 1990. Exhibit 5 outlines the top House recipients of contributions from the health and insurance industries; here, too, all who are listed were incumbents, and all were reelected. The link between committee assignments and campaign cash was far more evident in the House. Ironically, however, the top recipient of all-Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)-has no health-related committee assignments. A major factor in her large total was the fact that she ran two separate campaigns during the 1989-1990 election cycle. The most expensive of those was a special election in August 1989 to fill the vacancy left by the death of Democrat Claude Pepper. Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), the number-two recipient of health industry funds, is chair of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. Fortney H. (Pete) Stark (D-CA), the number-four recipient, chairs the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health. Members of those two key committees averaged more than $40,000 in health industry contributions in the 1990 elections-almost double the amount received by members of other committees whose jurisdiction is less directly tied to health.
The importance of those committees to the health industry is reflected in the fact that five of the top ten House recipients sit on the Energy and Commerce health subcommittee. One other member, Jim D ATAW ATC H 1 2 9
Moody (D-WI), sits on the Ways and Means health subcommittee. Robert T. Matsui (D-CA), the third-ranking recipient, is cochair of the House Democratic Task Force on Health. Nine of the top ten House recipients of insurance contributions were members of the tax-writing Ways and Means Committee. The only exception was Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO). The list reveals a striking pattern of insurance industry contributions: They are heavily targeted to members with direct influence on tax policy.
The Way Money Works In Washington
During 1989-1990, Congress tackled several important health-related measures, although consensus on the larger issue of national health insurance remained elusive. That pattern was in many ways typical of legislation debated in Washington. Most of the battles over health care in 1989 and 1990 were over relatively small-scale adjustments to current law, which may be crucial to specific industries or professional groups but generally pass unnoticed by the public. The bigger issue-solving the problem of rapidly escalating health costs and improving the plight of millions of uninsured or underinsured Americans-was never faced. The nonemergence of that underlying issue also reveals much about the way money influences legislative behavior. Disputes between competing segments of the same industry-as in the case of specialists versus primary care physicians-are the staples of Washington's legislative diet. Large-scale overhauls, such as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 or the Tax Reform Act of 1986, emerge only rarely and often bear little resemblance in their final form to the original proposals.
Industry groups, including health and insurance, often contribute money not to pass legislation, but to prevent it. The deferral of serious debate over national health insurance is a prime example of what might be called "preventive medicine" by the health industry. The $16 million it spent in campaign contributions may have helped to sway a few votes in the debates between pharmaceutical companies or between specialists and primary care physicians, but its larger side effect was to dampen any legislative enthusiasm for a major health system overhaul.
The rising costs of campaigning-and in 1992, the added threat of a restive electorate and newly drawn districts-have made members of Congress more dependent than ever on raising large sums of campaign cash to fuel their reelection drives. It has also made many members even more reluctant to alienate major sources of campaign funds by taking on industries that resist what they see as legislative interference from Washington. On the other hand, campaign contributions alone are not enough to pass major new laws or to forestall forever major changes in existing laws where the public demands change. Mindful of those political realities and of the growing public intolerance of sky-high health and insurance costs, the industry is shifting its strategy from preventing national health insurance to proposing palatable alternatives.
When the 103d Congress takes office in January 1993-filled with many new faces-health care legislation is going to be near the top of the agenda. The millions of dollars that flow from the industry to the lawmakers in campaign contributions will be a powerful force in cementing friendly relationships with those lawmakers as the highstakes debate over the future of America's health system begins in earnest.
The Money In The 1992 Elections
Final figures on campaign contributions in the 1992 elections were not available at press time, but an analysis of PAC contributions through the first eighteen months of the 1992 election cycle (1 January 1991 through 30 June 1992) h s ows that the health and insurance industries remain important sources of campaign funds for congressional candidates (Exhibit 6). By 30 June 1992 health industry PACs had contributed more than $8.3 million to federal candidates. Of that total, 63 percent went to Democrats and 37 percent went to Republicans. The dollars were heavily weighted toward incumbents. In all, 81 percent of the contributions went to current officeholders, 6 percent went to challengers, and the remaining 13 percent went to candidates in open-seat races where no incumbents were running. Health professionals again led the spending in the health sector, providing more than $5.1 million in PAC contributions. Hospitals and nursing homes contributed just over $1.0 million. Pharmaceutical and health product manufacturers gave $1.9 million. Health services PACs gave $250,000.
Insurance PACs gave a total of $6.4 million during the same eighteenmonth period. More than half of the money came from firms with diversified insurance interests. Another $752,000 came from companies concentrating on health and accident coverage. Some $2.1 million came from life insurance companies (many of which also carry health insurance). Only $84,000 came from property and casualty companies with no direct interest in national health care legislation.
Among health PACs, the AMA again led in overall contributions; the ADA ranked second. The rest of the leading contributors were also familiar names in the health industry PAC community. Nine of the top ten contributors for the first eighteen months of the 1992 election cycle were also on 1990's top ten list. 1992 was also a near-repeat of the 1990 lineup. Eight of the PACs appeared on the top ten list during both election cycles. The list of leading recipients of health and insurance PAC funds in 1992 illustrates the variation in fund-raising patterns between the House and the Senate (Exhibit 7). The leading Senate recipients are all currently seeking election or reelection to six-year terms. The only repeating member on the Senate top ten list was Dan Coats (R-IN), who ran in 1990 for a shortened two-year Senate seat, then ran again in 1992 for a full six-year term. The top three House recipients of health industry PAC money in 1992 were also leading recipients in 1990. Congressmen Waxman, Stark, and Gephardt each had collected more than $100,000 from health PACs through the end of June. to Bush, who collected $372,000 as opposed to Clinton's $112,000. All of these contributions came from individuals, not from PACs. Individuals from the pharmaceutical industry were even stronger in their preference for the Republican ticket, delivering $85,000 to Bush and just $12,000 to Clinton.
The figures, however, are far from complete, as both the Bush and Clinton campaigns failed to identify fully the economic interests of their contributors. They also do not include contributions to independent candidate Ross Perot. Despite a provision in federal campaign law that requires campaigns to make their "best effort" to disclose the occupations and employers of all contributors giving $200 or more, neither campaign came close to fulfilling the letter of the law. Through the end of June, the Clinton campaign had identified the occupation or employer of only 48 percent of its large contributors. The Bush campaign provided the information for only one-third of its large contributors. By cross-checking contributors with donations to other candidates and by consulting a variety of corporate and professional directories, the center was able eventually to identify many of the contributors whose interests were left blank by the campaigns. But many more are still unknown.
A second, much larger pocket of campaign cash in presidential elections can be found in the phenomenon that has come to be known as "soft-money" contributions to the political parties. As a result of the post-Watergate reforms of the 1970s, direct contributions to presidential candidates are prohibited once the parties officially nominate their candidates at the party conventions. The fall campaign is supposed to be financed exclusively through federal funds, supplied by taxpayers via the annual one-dollar checkoff on the federal income tax form. Ironically, however, fund raising for the presidential campaigns tends to intensify, rather than halt, when the fall campaigns begin. The checks are simply written to the parties rather than the candidates, and the biggest checks of all are written to the parties' "soft-money" accounts.
These accounts are supposed to be used for generic "party-building purposes," paying for such items as bumper stickers, yard signs, and get-out-the-vote efforts-primarily to assist the efforts of state and local candidates. To encourage stronger parties, Congress exempted such contributions from limits or restrictions and removed the prohibition against direct corporate and labor union contributions. ized "Team 100," a blue-chip group whose entry fee was a contribution of $100,000 or more to the Republican Party. More than 240 individuals and corporations joined in 1988; several were rewarded with ambassadorships after the election. Team 100 helped to fuel Bush's unsuccessful reelection effort in 1992, but the Democrats countered with a group of their own. The Democrats' top-level donors contribute or raise $200,000 to join the "Managing Trustees."
Through the end of August 1992, the insurance industry had contributed more than $2.7 million in soft money to the parties (Exhibit 8). Of that total, $2.2 million went to the Republicans. Pharmaceutical and health products manufacturers gave nearly $1.7 million in soft money over the same period-$1.2 million of which went to the Republicans. Physicians and other health professionals also preferred the Republicans by a wide margin, giving $448,000 to the Republicans and just $243,000 to the Democrats. Only hospitals and nursing home operators came close to party parity, giving $209,000 to the Republicans and $172,000 to the Democrats.
In all, the parties collected more than $62 million in soft-money contributions through the end of August. The Republicans outraised the Democrats by a factor of two to one. Late in the election cycle, however, that trend began to shift in favor of the Democrats, as polls showed Bill Clinton leading George Bush by a strong and consistent margin, and contributors of many political stripes rushed to put their money behind Clinton should the polls prove accurate on Election Day.
